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Abstract
The recent wave of ﬁnancial crises has fueled the debate on the eﬀect
of IFIs intervention on governments’ incentives to undertake reforms. In
this paper we treat this intervention more generally as a country insurance
contract, and examine its implications in a stylized set-up. More precisely,
we identify the conditions under which the positive insurance eﬀect dom-
inates moral hazard considerations, and the channels through which this
is achieved. In particular, we ﬁnd that the case for country insurance
is stronger for crisis-prone volatile economies, especially so if assistance
is made contingent on the occurrence of adverse external macroeconomic
shocks. Overall, our ﬁndings argue in favor of fairly-priced country in-
surance or insurance-type standing credit facilities that can be factored
in ex ante by the borrowing government, as opposed to the customized
discretionary bailouts.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The recent wave of ﬁnancial crises has fueled a heated debate on the eﬀectiveness
of International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs) interventions. Eﬀectiveness, in
this context, refers to whether rescue packages were adequate (with a view to
minimizing the overall costs of the crisis) and incentive-compatible (with a view
to minimizing the likelihood of similar episodes in the future), or possibly both.
Evaluating the role of the IFIs and its moral hazard consequences, however,
requires a clear understanding of how international safety nets (more generally,
country insurance) aﬀect emerging economies’ incentives to undertake politically
costly reforms that may aﬀect their ﬁnancial vulnerability in the future. This
paper puts forward a stylized analytic framework to identify these eﬀects, and
assess its implications.
Interestingly enough, IFIs’ bailout policies have faced criticism for diﬀerent,
and often opposite reasons. While antiglobalization groups accuse IFIs of not
providing distressed countries with enough resources to protect the poor, free-
marketers blame the same IFIs for undermining market discipline through their
excessive largesse. While diﬃcult to reconcile ideologically, these two opposite
views can be encompassed in a framework that trades oﬀ current economic and
social costs (which could be denoted, for simplicity, real hazard) and future
costs in terms of excessive risk taking or insuﬃcient reform (which are typically
associated with moral hazard).
As Haldane and Taylor [2003] clearly point out, “IMF facilities can usefully
be considered as a kind of insurance policy. [...] Liquidity crises represent a real
hazard that such insurance can help mitigate. In this role, IMF insurance is
clearly welfare enhancing. As with any insurance policy, however [...] mitigating
the real hazard of crisis might at the same time aggravate the moral hazard
of distorted incentives” (p.122). The question of whether such moral-hazard
costs are so large that “the IMF might consider changing its name to IMH—
the Institute for Moral Hazard” (Barro [1998]) or so small that “Argentina’s
diﬃculty in obtaining IMF lending has to do with an overstating of the problem
of moral hazard” (Griﬃth-Jones [2003]) is an empirical question that, while
already the subject of a growing literature, remains elusive.
Zhang [1999] studies the emerging market bond spreads before and after the
Mexican bailout, and ﬁnds no evidence of moral hazard. Lane and Philips [2000]
look at how emerging market bond spreads, between 1995 and 1999, reacted to
a number of IMF-related news and only ﬁnd two (out of 22) episodes in which
interest rate spread behavior was consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis.
One of these two episodes is the increase in emerging market spreads in the
aftermath of the Russian 1998 default. This event is carefully analyzed by
Dell’Ariccia et al. [2002] who estimate a structural model for emerging market
bond spread and show, consistently with the moral hazard hypothesis, that the
failed Russian bailout increased spread levels, their sensitivity to fundamentals,
and their cross-country dispersion.
Even if one accepts that international bailouts may create investor moral
hazard, this does not imply, as often suggested, that such moral hazard is at the
2expenses of global taxpayers. Indeed, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer [2001] provide
evidence that the IMF repayment record is very good 1 so that oﬃcial crisis
lending de facto involves virtually no cost to the rest of the world. If this is
the case, rescue packages should not be considered as state-contingent transfers
but rather as state-contingent loans, that is (broadly speaking), as fairly priced
country insurance policies. If this is the case, the moral hazard problem “lies in
the interaction between international bailouts and domestic policies, as pointed
out by Calomiris [1998]. The international ﬁnancial safety net increases the
s c o p ef o rb a dp o l i c i e sa sw e l la sg o o dp o l i c i e s . ”(Jeanne and Zettelmeyer [2001],
p. 411, emphasis added).
Using this focus on debtors (as opposed to lenders) moral hazard as our start-
ing point, this paper provides a stylized analytical framework that sheds light on
the incentive trade-oﬀs associated with the presence of an international safety
net or country insurance scheme. More precisely, we identify the implications
of country insurance on diﬀerent kind of reforms, under diﬀerent assumptions
regarding the sources of ﬁnancial fragility triggering a crisis. Opting for a par-
simonious framework allows us to encompass a number of situations (some, but
not all of them, addressed by the existing literature) and channels through which
country insurance can indeed enhance the returns on reform eﬀort and reinforce
reform incentives; and this despite the presence of moral-hazard.
We ﬁnd that country insurance may strengthen the incentives to invest in
“enhancing” reforms since expected payoﬀs are negatively correlated with the
probability of a crisis, particularly if insurance is made contingent on the real-
ization of an adverse macroeconomic shock. On the other hand, as the cost of
a crisis works as a disciplining reform-inducing mechanism, the moral-hazard
component of insurance becomes more relevant as this cost increases, and may
oﬀset the beneﬁcial impact of insurance as it becomes suﬃciently high.
In addition, we ﬁnd that insurance is more likely to stimulate reform in crisis-
prone volatile economies. More precisely, the higher the probability of a crisis,
the stronger the case for country insurance, while the higher macroeconomic
volatility, the stronger the case for contingent country insurance.
Finally, our analysis underscores that the consequences of country insurance
depend crucially of the type of reform under consideration and, speciﬁcally,
on the distribution of reform payoﬀs across states. In particular, “buﬀering”
reforms that tend to reduce the real impact of adverse shocks and, as a result,
pay oﬀ relatively more in the event of a crisis are likely to beneﬁt less (and, in
the limit, to be discouraged) by insurance, as the latter partially substitutes for
the former. By contrasts, country insurance would be particularly conducive
for “enhancing” reforms that pay oﬀ more handsomely in tranquil times.
The idea that a ﬁnancial safety net can be made incentive-compatible was
developed by Cordella and Levy Yeyati [2003] in the context of a banking model,
where they showed that a central bank that commits to bailout insolvent in-
stitutions in times of adverse macroeconomic conditions creates a risk-reducing
“value eﬀect” that lessens both the frequency of bankruptcies and overall bank
1They estimate in 5-percent the upper bound for the default rate.
3risk. As the authors suggest, their domestic lender-of-last-resort scheme may be
readily generalized to an international setting. In particular, they argue that
“an international lender of last resort that ensures that liquidity constrained
central banks can implement the optimal bailout policy in full could contribute
to reduce bank risk in the long run” (p.323). The intuition that international
bailouts may be incentive-compatible has been recently discussed, in a diﬀerent
context, by Corsetti et al. [2003] and Morris and Shin [2003]. The ﬁrst paper
develops a model in which international liquidity support can either generate
debtor moral hazard or, by reducing liquidation costs in the event of a run, it
can create the incentives for a government to implement costly reforms. The
second paper shows that if currency crises are caused by creditors’ coordina-
tion failure, bailouts sometime enhance the incentives for governments to take
preventive actions. This is indeed the case when IMF’s decisions are strate-
gic complements with the adjustment eﬀo r to ft h ec o u n t r y ,a n dt h er o l l - o v e r
decisions of the private sector creditors.
In the last part of the paper, we extend our stylized model to incorporate
these contributions and better understand how they relate to our main ﬁnd-
ings. More precisely, we show that the introduction of a dynamic value eﬀect
reinforces the case for contingent country insurance, the more so the longer the
eﬀective planning horizon of the policy maker. Indeed, we argue that a contin-
gent insurance could be used as a screening device to separate committed from
opportunistic governments. Similarly, we ﬁnd that the presence of self-fulﬁlling
liquidity runs provides an additional rationale in favor of insurance, this time
by reducing the incidence of self-fulﬁlling crises that erode reform payoﬀsa n d
thus undermine reform incentives.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the model
and derives main analytical results. Section 3 discusses more in depth the
incidence of the nature of reforms, as well as the more practical questions of
implementability and the scope for using crisis costs as an alternative incentive
mechanism. The section also presents extensions that examine the role of the
value eﬀect and the presence of self-fulﬁlling crises. Finally, section 4 extracts
some policy implications and concludes.
2 The Model
To discuss the diﬀerent eﬀects that a country insurance policy may have on
policymakers’ incentives to undertake reforms, we present an extremely stylized
framework in which a country (the “emerging market”) borrows a ﬁxed amount
(a unit) of capital from the international capital market. Abstracting from
whether the borrower is the private sector or the government, we assume that
creditors are repaid in full unless a “crisis” occurs. Crises, deﬁned as those
states in which the borrower cannot repay its obligations,2 are costly for the
government, and their likelihood can be reduced by embracing reforms that,
2The fact that we rule out partial repayment is just for the sake of simplicity and do not
aﬀect our main results.
4however, are also costly. Reforms, beside reducing the likelihood of a crisis, also
generate “returns” to policymakers.3 Such returns are state contingent, and
thus depend on whether the country insurance is in place or not.
More precisely, we assume that, in the absence of insurance, a crisis happens
(a country is insolvent) with probability π =1− sje,w h e r ee ∈ [0,1] denotes
the government’s reform eﬀort. The stochastic variable sj, j = B, G,r e ﬂects
observable aggregate macroeconomic conditions, and subscripts B,a n dG,d e -
note “good” and “bad” states, so that sB <s G < 1. In this simple set-up,
for a given level of eﬀort, the probability of a crisis is higher in bad states;
and for a given state, a crisis is more likely when eﬀort is low. For the sake of
simplicity, we further assume that Pr(sB)=P r ( sG)=1
2,a n dt h a tsB = γ − α;
sG = γ + α. These two assumptions imply that the probability of a crisis is
given by π =1− γe. From now on, we refer to γ as expected macroeconomic
fundamentals and to α as macroeconomic volatility.
The insurance contracts we analyze is a policy that stipulates the conditions
under which an “insurer” provides the funds necessary to repay lenders in the
event of an insolvency crisis. More precisely, we consider two extremely simple
contracts: one that insures the creditors against insolvency whenever it occurs,
and one that does it only in presence of bad macroeconomic shock.4 Under
both contracts, the country faces three possible scenarios: solvency (which we
henceforth denote as “tranquil” times); insolvency where default is avoided by
the forthcoming insurance money (which we denote as “turbulent” times) and
a insolvency followed by default (a “crisis”).
Note that an insurance contract can, in principle, be written as a function of
realized reform eﬀort. In practice, however, the measurement and veriﬁability
of reform is bound to be contestable, to an extent that may prevent the enforce-
ment of the contract. To capture this limitation, we assume that reform eﬀort is
not veriﬁable and thus cannot be used to condition the provision of insurance.
As noted, we assume that reforms generate “returns” to the government.
We let such returns be equal to µ ≤ 1 in tranquil times, to β in turbulent times,
and to λ in crisis periods. In order to rule out the trivial cases in which country
insurance is either always or never optimal, we work under the assumption that
µ ≥ β ≥ λ. Finally we assume that the occurrence of a crisis entails a ﬁxed cost
to the government equal to C.
The assumption that, in the event of insolvency, reform payoﬀsa r eh i g h e r
if the country is insured captures the eﬀort-increasing eﬀect (the “carrot”) of
the insurance policy.5 This eﬀect is counterbalanced by the standard moral
3There are a number of ways in which reforms may increase the government’s utility. For
example, reforms may be productivity enhancing (with the country’s income an argument of
the government’s objetive function) or may maximize tax revenues (with the government’s
income, and its allocation, an argument of the government objetctive function). The way in
which the political returns of reforms diﬀer according to the country’s macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial conditions will depend on the nature of the reform. We will come back to this issue
later on.
4It is easy to show that these two contracts strictly dominate all other feasible contracts.
5A natural way to interpret this eﬀect is to think of β − λ as the result of a lower cost of
capital under unfavorable macroeconomic conditions when the country’s repayment capacity
5hazard eﬀect introduced by the insurance policy which, in our framework, is
associated with the elimination of the cost of crises, C, in those states in which
the insurance is activated.6
Assuming quadratic eﬀort costs c(e)=e2, the problem of the government in
absence of insurance (denoted by the subscript NI)i sg i v e nb y
Max
e UNI = γµe2 +( 1− γe)(λe − C) − e2, (1)




2(1 − γ (µ − λ))
. (2)
As expected, the optimal level of eﬀort is a positive function of the cost of
ac r i s i s(
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The reform payoﬀ during a crisis, λ,h a s ,h o w e v e r ,a na m b i g u o u se ﬀect on
policymakers’ willingness to undertake reforms. A higher value of λ, by reducing
the loss associated with defaults, raises the payoﬀ of reforms. However, it also
weakens the incentives to reduce the probability of a crisis. In the Appendix,
we show that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second when the cost of the crises
are low enough, that is in situations in which the disciplinary eﬀect of crises is
necessarily limited.
The introduction of a blanket insurance policy that guarantees creditors
whenever the country becomes insolvent (a case denoted by the subscript BI )
modiﬁes the problem to:
Max
e UBI = γµe2 +( 1− γe)βe− e2, (3)




2(1 − γ (µ − β))
. (4)




∂γ > 0), with the reform payoﬀs in tranquil (
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∂β > 0). Of course, under such policy, the disciplinary eﬀect of the
crisis is deemed to play no role.
is preserved (at least partially) by the insurance policy.
6In its simplicity, our model seems to rule out the possibility of moral hazard in absence
of insurance. However this is not necessarily the case. Moral hazard considerations can be
introduced in a straightforward way assuming that the government does not bear the full
social cost of the crisis. The case λ = C =0is indeed equivalent to the standard limited
liability case. Indeed, the insurance related moral hazard we measure should not be thought
in absolute but in relative terms.
7All results mentioned in the text are formally derived in the Appendix.
8Since we normalized reform payoﬀs in tranquil times to unity, the increase in refoirm
payoﬀ in turbulent and crisis are always to be understood as changes relative to tranquil
times.
6Finally, we study the eﬀects of a conditional insurance policy (denoted by
the subscript CI), that is of a creditors’ guarantee that is activated exclusively
in bad times (s = sB). The government’s problem can now be rewritten as:
Max
e UCI = γµe2 +
1
2
(1 − (γ − α)e)βe+
1
2
(1 − (γ + α)e)(λe − C) − e2, (5)
f r o mw h i c hw eh a v et h a t
e∗
CI =
β + λ + C(α + γ)
4(1 − µγ) − 2α(β − λ)+2 γ(β + λ)
. (6)
As before, the optimal level of reform eﬀort is a positive function of the
cost of a crisis (
∂e∗
CI








The reform payoﬀs in turbulent (β) and in crisis times (λ)h a v e ,h o w e v e r ,a n
ambiguous eﬀect on policymakers’ willingness to undertake reforms. As in the
case of the blanket insurance, the reform payoﬀ during a crisis, λ, has a positive
eﬀect on policymakers’ willingness to undertake reforms. only when the costs of
t h ec r i s i sa r el o we n o u g h .T h es a m ei st r u ef o rt h er e f o r mp a y o ﬀs in turbulent
times. It is only when the disciplinary eﬀects of the crisis are limited that
the insurance eﬀect of the safety net provided by the insurance in crisis times
dominates the moral hazard eﬀe c to fs u c hp o l i c y .
We are now in a position to compare the reform eﬀort in the three diﬀerent
scenarios discussed above, and see under which conditions country insurance
s c h e m e sf o s t e ro rh i n d e rr e f o r me ﬀort.
Result 1 :
(i) If the crisis costs are very low (C<C 1 ≡
(β−λ)(1−µγ−αβ)
(γ+α)(1−(µ−β)γ)), the reform eﬀort
is highest under a blanket insurance, and lowest under the no insurance regime
(eBI >e CI >e NI);
(ii) If the crisis costs are low (C1 <C<C 2 ≡
(β−λ)(1−µγ)
γ(1−(µ−β)γ)), the reform eﬀort
is highest under conditional insurance and lowest under no insurance (eCI >
eNI >e BI);
(iii) If the crisis costs are high (C2 <C<C 3 ≡
(β−λ)(1−µγ+αλ)
(γ−α)(1−(µ−β)γ)), the reform
eﬀort is highest under conditional insurance, and lowest under blanket insurance
(eCI >e BI >e NI);
(iv) If the crisis costs are very high (C>C 3), the reform eﬀort is highest under
no insurance, and lowest under a blanket insurance (eNI >e CI >e BI).
Proof: See Appendix
To grasp the intuition of these results, it is best to start by comparing the
no-insurance, and blanket-insurance cases. First, notice that the main force at
works is the interplay between the motivating carrot of the insurance, captured
by the diﬀerence between the reform payoﬀ in turbulent and crisis times, and the
dissuasive stick of crisis costs, which the insurance policy necessarily attenuates.
7It is not surprising, then, that if the stick is large enough, reform eﬀort will be
lower under an unconditional insurance policy. Conversely, a weak stick would
imply a weak moral hazard problem as a result of a blanket insurance, which
would then provide better incentives for reform.
The moral hazard aspect detracts from the beneﬁts of the blanket insurance
when the cost of the crisis increases. This eﬀect can be attenuated by condition-
ing the insurance policy to the realization of a bad shock. The reason this might
be “incentive compatible” is well-known in principal agent models.9 Indeed, a
state contingent insurance increases the value of eﬀort in those states in which
a failure is most likely to be the consequence of external circumstances (a bad
shock) and preserves the stick in those states in which a failure is most likely to
be associated with insuﬃcient reform. In terms of the previous trade-oﬀ,t h i s
contingent policy entails both a smaller carrot (since it is now available only
in the event of a bad shock) and a weaker stick (eﬀective only if the country
becomes insolvent under good macroeconomic conditions). However, the ﬁrst
eﬀect is proportionally smaller than the second one, improving upon a blanket
insurance as the moral hazard gains importance (C>C 1) and leading to more
reform than in the no-insurance case as long as moral hazard does not become
an overwhelming concern (C<C 3).
A clearer intuition of the conditioning mechanism can be obtained with the
help of a limiting example in which a bad shock causes insolvency with certainty
(α = γ so that sB =0 ). Substituting these values in the ﬁrst order conditions of
the maximization problem, it is immediate to verify that the diﬀerence in the
marginal utility of reform eﬀort in the contingent insurance and the no insurance
scenario (∂UCI
∂e − ∂UNI
∂e ) is simply given by
(β−λ)
2 .I n t h i sc a s e ,t h e o n l ye ﬀect
of the introduction of insurance is a higher return on reform contingent on
a bad shock. The moral hazard component, on the other hand, disappears,
since the incidence of reform on the probability of insolvency under adverse
macroeconomic conditions is, in this extreme situation, inexistent.
The above example suggests that the eﬀectiveness of country insurance con-
tracts in fostering reforms depends not only on the reform payoﬀs in the diﬀerent
scenarios, but also on macroeconomic fundamentals and macroeconomic volatil-
ity. More precisely, if the appeal of a country insurance is measured in its ability
to foster reform eﬀort :
Result 2 :
(i) The higher the probability of a crisis for a given level of reform (the lower
γ) ,t h es t r o n g e rt h ec a s ef o ri n s u r a n c e ;
(ii) The higher macroeconomic volatility (α), the stronger the case for contingent
insurance;
Proof: See Appendix
9The classical reference is Hölmstrom (1988). In our set-up, the probability that the
crisis is caused by policymakers’ lack of reform eﬀort is proportional to the value of the
the macroeconomic conditions sj. This implies that reform eﬀort satisﬁes Milgrom’s (1988)
monotone likelihood ratio property, and ensures that the “optimal” insurance policy is, loosely
speaking, monotonic in sj.
8These results shed some light on the characteristics that would make a coun-
try a natural candidates for the insurance policy we suggest: a crisis-prone
volatile economy. Indeed, in the presence of good and stable macroeconomic
fundamentals that reduce the probability of a crisis, expected reform payoﬀs
are already high, and likely to be undermined by the moral hazard compo-
nent of the insurance policy. By contrast, when the expected returns on reform
are reduced by adverse or highly unpredictable macroeconomic context, coun-
try insurance may oﬀset this eﬀect strengthening the incentives to reform and
outweighting moral hazard considerations. Then, it is not surprising that high
macroeconomic volatility reinforces the case for conditional insurance. Under
such policy, the insurance is in place only in those states in which moral hazard
eﬀects are necessarily subdued, while in those states world in which moral haz-
ard should be a concern, the disciplining eﬀect of the cost of a crisis is preserved.
3 Discussion
The simpliﬁed model presented above highlights the main trade-oﬀs underscor-
ing much of the discussion on international bailouts, particularly, their eﬀect on
borrowers’ moral hazard and on their incentives to undertake reforms. In this
section, we specialize the analysis to better illuminate its policy implications.
First, we look in more detail into the link between insurance and incentives and
how it relates to the nature of the reform at hand. Next, we raise the critical
issue of insurance contract’s implementation costs. Finally, we extend the model
to address some recent contributions in the bailout literature, drawing attention
to the basic ingredients behind them and how they relate to our ﬁndings.
3.1 Enhancing versus buﬀering reforms
Following the existing literature, we have used the term reform to denote a
diverse set of government policies that tend to enhance long-run productivity
and increased the country’s resilience in periods of ﬁnancial distress, at a short-
run (political if not economic) cost. These consequences of reforms are captured
in our model, respectively, by the level of marginal reform payoﬀsi ne a c hs t a t e ,
and by relative reform payoﬀsa c r o s ss t a t e s . 10
However, the relative payoﬀs under diﬀerent scenarios (and, in turn, the
impact of country insurance) are likely to diﬀer substantially according to the
speciﬁc nature of the reform under consideration. On the one hand, deregula-
tion or government retrenchment that tend to enhance productivity across the
board may increase the relative payoﬀ in tranquil times. Thus, for example,
privatization of state-owned utilities may raise eﬃciency under all scenarios, at
the cost of increasing the rigidity of utilities prices (and reducing political rents)
10Notice that in our analysis, we implicitely assumed that reform precedes the realization
of the shock and that the associated reform costs are incurred ex-ante so as to make them
state-independent. More in general, these costs may also diﬀer across states, in which case
reform payoﬀs can be thought of as already reﬂecting these diﬀerences.
9during turbulent and crisis periods. On the other, prudential reforms that in-
crease capitalization and liquidity ratios of domestic banks may attenuate the
impact of an adverse shock and the costs of a crisis, at the expense of wider
intermediation margins in tranquil times. Similarly, tax reforms that improve
ﬁscal accounts at the cost of a higher eﬀective tax burden, by making govern-
ment revenues less procyclical and broadening the scope for countercyclical ﬁscal
policy, are particularly beneﬁcial under adverse macroeconomic conditions.
Broadly speaking, then, reforms could be deﬁned as “enhancing” or “buﬀer-
ing,” according to whether their payoﬀs are relatively higher or lower in tranquil
times (more generally, whether they contribute to enhance the upside or buﬀer
the downside of the distribution of returns across states). In the context of our
model, this distinction can be simply captured by the diﬀerence in the para-
meters that determine reform payoﬀs (µ − λ): The more preventive the nature
of the reform, the wider this diﬀerence.11 Based on this simple taxonomy, it is
easy to show that
Result 3 The scope for reform-inducing country insurance policies narrows
with the buﬀe r i n gn a t u r eo fr e f o r m s .
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Due to their self-insurance
nature, buﬀering reforms aimed at attenuating the impact of adverse macro-
economic conditions are partial substitutes for the country insurance policies
discussed above. As a result, the presence of the latter reduces the need for
the former. Conversely, it has often been the case in the past that a devastat-
ing ﬁnancial crisis was the trigger for ﬁnancial (particularly, prudential) reform.
Note, however, that Result 3 does not necessarily imply that country insurance
is not warranted even in those cases: unlike enhancing reforms, self-insurance
policies of the type previously described may be unnecessarily costly in economic
terms relative to a standard insurance contract.
3.2 Is country insurance feasible?
It can be shown that any eﬀort-inducing insurance policy such as those described
above will be implementable, in the sense that a government will voluntarily pay
up front a fair insurance fee to the insurer if the policy were available.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that, in equilibrium, the ﬁnancial costs (per unit of
debt) born by the country are the same with or without insurance. A rational
risk-neutral lender will set interest rates so that the expected returns to his
investment is always equal to the reference risk-free rate. This returns will
11In addition, some preventive reforms (e.g., higher bank liquidity requirements or social
safety nets) may lead directly to a reduction of the deadweight loss of a crisis, C.T h i sc a s e
can be readily represented as a change in λ,b yr e p l a c i n gt h eﬁxed cost of the crisis C with
a (slightly) more general C (e)=C − θe, where a preventive reform may be characterized by
θ>0. In turn, the marginal return on reform in crisis times would now equal λ = λ + θ,
reducing the scope for country insurance (since
∂C3
∂λ < 0).
10reﬂect expected payments by the borrower plus the expected outlays of the
insurance policy (in turn, equal to the fair insurance premium), so that the
combined expected cost of debt servicing and insurance premium should also
be equal to the risk-free rate under any scenario. As a result, the government’s
decision whether or not to insure hinges on a comparison of the equilibrium
values of the objective function in each case. It is then easy to show that:
Result 4 A government will always be willing to purchase a reform-inducing
country insurance at a fair premium.
Proof: See Appendix
The previous theoretical argument, while appealing, ignores important prac-
tical considerations. First, the size of the stock of net ﬁnancial liabilities in
most emerging economies exceeds the ﬁnancial and diversiﬁcation capacity of
any private agent or consortium of agents. Second, even if a consortium of in-
surers could credibly provide this contract for smaller economies, it is unlikely
that the insured government can prevent insuring institutions, as sovereign risk
mounts, from hedging their growing exposure by shortening the country’s debt,
feeding back into the crisis dynamics.12 Finally, the inverse moral hazard prob-
lem (speciﬁcally, the lack of mechanisms to ensure the solvency of the insurer)
cannot be underestimated, particular in an international context.
In light of the diﬃculties previously mentioned, many observers have sug-
gested that IFIs should play the role of country insurer or, as the literature
has put it, of international lender of last resort (ILLR).13 While the IFIs are
unlikely to overcome the size problem, they are free from inverse moral hazard
as well as from the temptation to hedge their exposure. In this regard, our
ﬁndings strongly qualify the traditional moral hazard criticism that typically
falls on IFIs after each ﬁnancial crisis, showing that the role of the IFIs as ILLR
may not necessarily lead to a delay in the implementation of pending reforms
and suggesting that IFIs are in a privileged position to provide, if not country
insurance, partial insurance schemes to the same eﬀect. A note of caution is
in order in the case of contingent insurance, particularly since the international
constituency of IFIs may weaken their capacity to condition their assistance.
However, even in this case, an explicit insurance facility may dominate an im-
plicit ones by reducing the IFI’s discretionary margin.14
12The same logic applies to currency risk: private insurers may accelerate a currency collapse
by short-selling the local currency to hedge their exposure. Note the underlying coordination
problem: although insurers are individually aware that by their hedging they increase the
probability of a collapse, their negative impact is diluted in the aggregate while the beneﬁts
from hedging accrue entirely to them. Thus, the argument implicitely assumes that no bank
will be willing or able to insure a country by itself. See Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2003) for a
detailed discussion of the practical obstacles for private country insurance.
13Fischer (1999) argues that the IMF has often played this role in practice, and has called for
changes in the international ﬁnancial architecture to acknowledged this function and improve
its eﬀectiveness. See also Eichengreen (1999) for a survey.
14Ultimately, as suggested by Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2003), inasmuch as political pres-
sures foster indiscriminate bailouts at the expense of conditionality, an explicit acknowledg-
113.3 A carrot and stick dilemma
Having shown that, under general conditions, country insurance may indeed be
eﬀort-inducing and, if so, implementable, it remains to discuss how this policy
fares in terms of other alternatives. In particular, while we assumed so far that
the cost of a crisis was exogenously given, it follows from the previous analysis
that a trivial alternative way to guarantee that reforms are undertaken consists
in raising such cost.
Regarding the latter, one has to bear in mind that the relevant costs are
those imposed on the decision maker (in our case, the government) and that
political costs, while negatively correlated with the overall macroeconomic sit-
uation, may also depend on non-economic factors. For example, a populist
government may gain substantial political rents by announcing a default in a
context of a recession, oﬀsetting the losses associated with the negative eﬀects
of default on economic activity. Timing is naturally also important, particu-
larly when the potential long-run cost of a crisis are compared with the certain
short-run cost of the reform eﬀort needed to prevent it. At any rate, the scope
for exogenously increasing the pain of a defaulting government is bound to be,
in practice, rather limited.
Moreover, from (2) and (4), we know that, in the absence of a blanket
guarantee, eﬀort depends directly on the cost of a crisis so that a larger stick,
while leading to deeper reform, would imply a loss for the government (and,
presumably, for the country as a whole). It follows that, for any level of reform
eﬀort attainable through the provision of country insurance, the stick (more in
general, an increase in the cost of a crisis) is dominated by the carrot. This, of
course, does not deny the beneﬁcial eﬀect a stick may have on the willingness
to reform and the related probability of a crisis. Indeed, the eﬀort associated
with a suﬃciently large stick (C>C 3) cannot be attained by country insurance.
However, inasmuch as these costs are, as assumed here, mostly wasted resources,
larger sticks, if feasible, would lead to more disciplined, but poorer countries.
3.4 The value eﬀect
In a dynamic model, Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2003) showed how a contingent
bailout policy, by decreasing the probability of a crisis, may enhance the ex-
pected continuation value of the borrower and, through this channel, the payoﬀ
of engaging in safer investment practices. The logic underlying this value eﬀect
(the impact of insurance on the value at risk of the insured country or, more
precisely, of its government) can be illuminated by extending our static model
into a multi-period setup with a similar timing of events. In addition, we need
to capture the fact that access to this continuation value is not guaranteed and
depends on the occurrence of a shock. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the gov-
ernment, which is reelected with a certain probability every non-crisis period,
ment appears to be preferable to the customary constructive ambiguity approach.
12is forced to step down whenever a crisis occurs.15 The government’s problem






where δ represents the combination of the government’s discount rate and the
probability of reelection, and k = NI, BI, CI,w i t hqNI = γe; qBI =1 ;a n d
qCI = 1















The ﬁrst thing to note is that, under standard regularity conditions, the
value eﬀect strengthens the incentives to reform whenever the second term be-
tween brackets is positive, which will be the case as long as the government’s
probability of survival responds to its own reform eﬀort. By contrast, the value
eﬀect disappears under a blanket insurance, since in this case qBI =1for all
levels of eﬀort and, thus, it is independent of the government’s actions. It is
immediate to verify, then, that the threshold cost of a crisis b C1 such as an un-
contingent insurance policy increases eﬀort would be smaller in the extended
setup: The introduction of a continuation value increases eﬀort under the no-
insurance case but not under a blanket insurance, weakening the case for the
latter.
More interesting is the case of contingent insurance. The diﬀerential impact










Thus, if macroeconomic shocks are suﬃciently disperse (in particular, if
bad shocks are suﬃciently extreme), the value eﬀect increases reform incentives
under a contingent insurance policy proportionally more than it does in the
absence of insurance.16
This result is open to several interesting implications. First, as before and
for the same reasons, high macroeconomic volatility strengthens the case for
contingent country insurance. Second, the condition depends crucially on the
parameter δ, which depends positively on the government’s discount rate and its
probability of reelection. Political aspects that tend to undercut the incumbent’s
chances to stay in oﬃce, as well as the lack of party discipline or a political
15The assumption is for expositional simplicity. The argument carries through as long as
the probability of reelection declines in crisis times.
16Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2003) ﬁnd that a bank bailout policy contingent on macro-
economic shocks being below certain threshold reduces banks’ risk appetite. One can invert
their proposition by saying that the existence of risk-reducing cotingent bailouts requires a
positive probability of suﬃciently bad shocks. Note the similarity of the result discussed here
in a diﬀerent context.
13afterlife that may extends the eﬀective planning horizon of the politician, would
weaken the incidence of the value eﬀect.
Interestingly, for any given value of crisis costs C, a contingent insurance
contract would increase reform eﬀort and, as a result, would be willingly pur-
chased by high-δ governments and turned down by low-δ ones. Thus, for any
given distribution of macroeconomic shocks, a contingent insurance contract
could be used as a screening device to separate committed from opportunistic
governments.
3.5 Self-fulﬁlling crises
The literature on bailouts and the international ﬁnancial architecture has re-
cently discussed the role of an the international lender of last resort in preempt-
ing self-fulﬁlling crisis, and the beneﬁcial, eﬀort-inducing impact of lowering the
incidence of crises through this channel that can, in some contexts, outweigh
moral hazard considerations. Morris and Shin (2002) illustrate how, for given
economic fundamentals, both reﬁnancing and servicing the debt, and suﬀering a
retrenchment of international capital that leads to default are possible scenarios
due to lack of coordination among the country’s creditors. In this context, they
show that liquidity insurance that ensures that debt can be serviced even in the
event of a partial retrenchment may avert a run by international investors much
in the same way in which deposit insurance does it at the domestic level.17 In
turn, Corsetti et al. (2003) argue that, under certain conditions, the associated
reduction in the probability of a crisis increases the marginal expected return
of government’s eﬀort reverting the traditional moral hazard argument.
It is easy to illustrate this argument using the simpliﬁed framework described
in this paper. To do that, ﬁrst notice that a liquidity run adds an additional
source of ﬁnancial distress to our original scenario. If, in the event of an adverse
shock, a country is more likely to face insolvency due to an economic downturn,
now this eﬀect is compounded by the higher probability of suﬀering a liquidity
crisis as uncoordinated investors preemptively rush to the exits. Country in-
surance in this context would reduce the probability of a (self-fulﬁlling) run for
any given level of expected economic fundamentals.
Our simple model can be easily extended to include this eﬀect by making
the stochastic variable sj a function of both macroeconomic shocks and the
propensity to suﬀer liquidity runs. More precisely, assume that sB = θ(γ − α);
sG = θ(γ + α),w i t h 1
γ+α >θ BI >θ CI >θ NI =1 . Here, the parameter θ
captures the link between observed fundamentals and the probability of a self-
fulﬁlling crisis, with a larger θ denoting a greater likelihood of a crisis for given
fundamentals. Underlying this assumption is the view that a crisis can occur ei-
ther due to solvency considerations (e.g., a sharp deterioration of macroeconomic
17Indeed, in the presence of liquidity insurance, previously reluctant investors are now will-
i n gt or e ﬁnance the country, reducing the actual lending through the insurance facility, which,
under some circumstances, may be a mere dissuasive device. Hence, the label “catalytic
ﬁnance” that the authors give to the facility.
14fundamentals) or due to a self-fulﬁlling runs that depend on the macroeconomic
outlook.
T h ep r e s e n c eo fs e l f - f u l ﬁlling crises introduces an additional, positive impact
of insurance on expected reform payoﬀs through a reduction in the probability
of a crisis. Then, if insurance was preferred in the absence of self-fulﬁlling
crises, it will be more so in their presence; on the other hand, if no insurance
was preferred, then the beneﬁcial eﬀect of insurance on the probability of a
self-fulﬁlling crises will tilt the balance in favor of insurance. As a result, the
thresholds above which the moral hazard eﬀect dominates are shifted up.
More formally, it is easy to verify that, in this new context, eﬀort will be








(θ − 1)(µ − β)
1 − (µ − β)γ
> 0,
and the superscript S denotes this new scenario in which self-fulﬁlling crises are









θ(γ − α)(1− (µ − β)γ)
> 0.
Conditions (8) and (9) clearly illustrate the two additional ways in which
insurance may inﬂuence the government’s decision to reform in this case. On
the one hand, by protecting the economy against avoidable liquidity runs that
erode reform payoﬀs, insurance enhances the eﬀect highlighted in the previous
section, improving the expected macroeconomic outlook and the marginal return
on reform. On the other, it creates incentives for reform even if the latter eﬀect
is absent (i.e., when β −λ =0 ). This is because, by lowering the probability of
an exogenous crisis, it reinforces the eﬀect of eﬀort on the likelihood of facing
tranquil times, extending the set of states for which reform yields are maximized.
Note that these ﬁndings are intimately related with the previous discussion
on the implications of macroeconomic volatility (represented by the parame-
ter α) on the advantages of insurance. As noted before, the lower exogenous
volatility is, the tighter the control of the government over ﬁnal outcomes and
the stronger the incentives to invest in reforms to improve those outcomes. Sim-
ilarly, in the presence of volatile capital markets, insurance eliminates one source
of macroeconomic volatility (liquidity runs) to the same eﬀect.
4F i n a l r e m a r k s
This paper presented a simple analytical framework to examine the impact
of country insurance on the government’s incentives to undertake economic re-
15forms. We identiﬁed three diﬀerent channels through which insurance can foster
reform. First, by reducing the probability that adverse macroeconomic condi-
tions evolve into a full-blown crisis, it increases the expected marginal payoﬀs
of reform. Second, state-contingent insurance, by increasing the continuation
value of the government, creates an additional incentive to advance with policies
that reduce the vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks. Finally, by averting self-
fulﬁlling liquidity crises, country insurance eliminates another exogenous source
of fragility that tend to erode expected reform payoﬀs. We argued that all three
channels tend to be particularly eﬀective in crisis-prone volatile economies, and
for enhancing reforms which payoﬀs are positively correlated with the macro-
economic context. On the contrary, buﬀering reforms that tend to oﬀset the
impact of adverse shocks as a way of self-insurance are made redundant (and,
in the limit, discouraged) by country insurance.
Among the many policy implications that can be derived from this analysis,
perhaps the main one relates to the way in which it qualiﬁes the traditional
moral hazard concern associated with the role played by IFIs in the manage-
ment and resolution of crises in developing countries. As the previous discus-
sion suggests, explicit insurance-type facilities may strengthen the incentives to
proceed with productivity enhancing reforms. Partial schemes of a similar na-
ture as those discussed here include state-contingent credit facilities or indexed
program lending,18 whereby debt payments are positively correlated with the
country’s current income. Curiously enough, although these two alternatives
are essentially identical in terms of their implications for the cash ﬂows of the
loan contract, they have been received very diﬀerently by the players involved.
In particular, while IFIs already oﬀer limited contingent credit lines, they have
ruled out the idea of changing the denomination of their lending on prudential
grounds.19
This paper attempted to illustrate, from a balanced perspective, the condi-
tions under which country insurance may stimulate reform while reducing the
pain inﬂicted to borrowing countries by the stick of crippling ﬁnancial disarray.
Our ﬁndings does not necessarily entail an endorsement of the customized and
discretionary way in which the IFIs currently assist countries in the event of a
crisis. Rather, the paper points at the beneﬁts of fairly-priced country insurance
or insurance-type standing facilities that can be factored in by the borrowing
government ex ante, particularly in those cases in which macroeconomic volatil-
ity may devalue the expected rewards of reform eﬀort.
18Indexes suggested in recent proposals include the borrower’s GDP (Borensztein and
Mauro, [2002]), the local CPI (Eichengreen and Hausmann, [2002]) and the price of a rel-
evant commodity (Caballero et al. [2003], for the particular case of copper-exporting Chile).
19Underlying this distinction lies the implicit privileged creditor status enjoyed by the IFIs
and the presumption that this ensures full repayment under all circumstances. By contrast,
by indexing their lending, the IFIs would be assuming the risk that they currently transfer to
residual creditors.
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Diﬀerentiating the maximand in (1) with respect to e we have that
∂UNI
∂e
= −2e(1 − (µ − λ)γ)+( γC + λ)=0 , (10)
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Diﬀerentiating e∗
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1 − γµ− Cγ2
2(1 − (µ − λ)γ)2 > 0 ⇔ C<
1 − γµ
γ2 . (14)
Diﬀerentiating the maximand in (3) with respect to e we have that
∂UBI
∂e
= −2e(1 − (µ − β)γ)+β =0 , (15)
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Diﬀerentiating e∗


















2(1 − (µ − β)γ)2 > 0. (18)






(−2e(2(1 − µγ)+β(γ − α)+λ(γ + α)) + (β + λ + C(γ + α)) = 0,
(19)
17from which it follows (SOCs are always veriﬁed) that
e∗
CI =
β + λ + C(α + γ)
2(2(1 − µγ)+β(γ − α)+λ(γ + α))
.
Diﬀerentiating e∗
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2(1 − γµ+ αλ) − C(γ2 − α2)
2(2(1 − µγ)+β(γ − α)+λ(γ + α))2 > 0 ⇔ C<
(1 − γµ+ αλ)






2(1 − γµ− αβ) − C(α + γ)2
2(2(1 − γ)+γ(γ + α)+β(γ − α)2 > 0 ⇔ C<
(1 − µγ − αβ)
(α + γ)2 . (24)
P r o o fo fR e s u l t1
By a simple comparison of (2), (4), and (6), it is straightforward to verify
that
eCI >e BI ⇔ C>C 1 ≡
(β − λ)(1 − µγ − αβ)
(γ + α)(1 − (µ − β)γ)
;
eNI >e BI ⇔ C>C 2 ≡
(β − λ)(1 − µγ)
γ(1 − (µ − β)γ)
;
eNI >e CI ⇔ C>C 3 ≡
(β − λ)(1 − µγ + αλ)
(γ − α)(1 − (µ − β)γ)
.
The fact that C3 >C 2 >C 1 > 0, completes the proof.¥
P r o o fo fR e s u l t2
Using Result 1,




(ii) It follows from: ∂C1
∂α = −
β−λ




P r o o fo fR e s u l t3




P r o o fo fR e s u l t4
It is enough to show that UBI (eBI) >U NI(eNI) for eBI >e NI,a n d






> 0 imply that UBI (eBI) <U NI(eNI) for eBI >
eNI. UCI (eCI) <U NI(eNI) for eCI >e NI follows from a similar argument..¥
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